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CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION BETWEEN
PARENT AND CHILD: A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT
Prior to 1978 no jurisdiction, either by statute or common law
decision, protected by a testimonial privilege the confidential
communications shared between parents and their children. Peo-
ple v. Doe is the seminal case which recognized a constitution-
ally based privilege arising out of the developing federal right to
privacy. This Comment explores the political theory, the psycho-
logical data, and the case law which mandates the protection of
confidences born of this most intimate relationship.
Shall it be said... , "[1]isten to your son at the risk of being compelled to
testify about his confidences?" 1
Parents and children probably never stop to consider whether
statements made between them in private are subject to a legally
sanctioned testimonial privilege. In fact, no state currently pro-
tects such confidential communications between parent and child
either by statute or by common law. Yet many parents, even if
pressed, would refuse to testify as to what their child confided to
them. There may be circumstances when an individual must an-
swer to a personal sense of morality even in the face of the law's
mandate to testify.2
Recently, an intermediate New York appellate court observed
that even absent legislative or common law protection a parent
might refuse to testify as to a child's confidences. 3 The court
based this conclusion upon a federal constitutional right to pri-
vacy.4 This Comment will briefly discuss the New York court's
1. People v. Doe, 61 App. Div. 2d 426, 429, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1978).
2. United States v. Worcester, 190 F. Supp. 548, 567 (D. Mass. 1960); H.
THOREAU, WALDEN AND CIVr. DISOBEDIENCE (Norton Critical ed. 1966).
3. People v. Doe, 61 App. Div. 2d at 429, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
4.' Id. at 430-33, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378-80. The Doe court's finding that a federal
right to privacy protects the child's confidential communications is consistent with
the broader developments in the law which recognize the constitutional rights of
children. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the safeguards of the Bill of
Rights and the fourteenth amendment are not "for adults alone." In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 13 (1967). See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1975); L.
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opinion, then systematically evolve a constitutionally based par-
ent-child testimonial privilege. The discussion will initially set
forth an evidentiary approach to privileges and will then explore
the political tradition of privacy and the family from a constitu-
tional perspective. Additionally, the Comment discusses the psy-
chological importance of confidentiality within the family context
to emphasize that this privilege is of constitutional magnitude.
Finally, a few of the limitations of a constitutionally protected
confidential parent-child privilege will be suggested.
BACKGROUND: PEOPLE V. DOE
In 1978, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court,
in People v. Doe,5 concluded that parents cannot be compelled to
testify before a grand jury as to the confidential statements that
their child previously made to them.6 Mr. Justice Denman, speak-
ing for the court, found that the confidential communications
were not protected by statute or by the common-law evidentiary
privileges.7 Notwithstanding this lack of protection, the court held
that the communications were within the protected zone of pri-
vacy created by the Federal Bill of Rights and made applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment.8 In reaching this
determination, the Doe court considered the United States
Supreme Court cases that recognize the critical role that the fam-
ily plays within the constitutional scheme.9 The court coupled
with this the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that the family
requires a favorable setting of privacy and autonomy. Once the
constitutional value of family privacy was implicated, the Doe
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTUnoNAL LAw § 16-29 (1978). See generally Note, Constitu-
tional Rights of High School Students, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 403 (1974). According to
one commentator, the rights of children should be concomitant with the more en-
compassing human rights movement. Coughlin, The Rights of Children, in TnE
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, EMERGENT CONCEPTS IN LAw AND SOCIETY 22 (A. Wilkerson
ed. 1973). See also United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A Res.
1386, 14 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 19, U.N. Doc. A/4249 (1960).
5. 61 App. Div. 2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978).
6. Id. at 435 n.9, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381 n.9. The court indicated in this note that
it was not addressing a situation in which parents wished to testify and their child
asserted a privilege. That situation would raise the broader question of who the
holder of the privilege should be. Certainly, if the underlying premise of the privi-
lege focuses on the vulnerability of the child, then the child must hold the privi-
lege. Parents can assert the privilege on the child's behalf unless he knowingly
and voluntarily waives the privilege. Whether the parents hold the parent-child
privilege in their own right is beyond the scope of this Comment. If they do, the
justification must be some theory other than the critical role that confidentiality
plays in the child's development.
7. Id. at 428-29, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 377-78.
8. Id. at 430-33, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378-79.
9. Id. at 429-33, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378-80.
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court balanced the state's interest in fact-finding against both the
state's interest and the individual's interest in securing the family
as a viable institution.0
The court's consideration of the intrusion into parent-child com-
munications as contrary to social utility weighed heavily in its
unanimous holding. This decision was premised on psychological
evidence that indicated that the child's "emotional stability, char-
acter and self-image" find their origin in the family" and that the
"atmosphere of trust and understanding without fear that his con-
fidences" will be broken are essential to the development of sta-
bility in the child's personality.' 2 In conclusion, the Doe court
reasoned that the price of obtaining the testimony was too great.13
In addition to the social disutility considerations, the justices
experienced an "instinctive revulsion" to requiring parental dis-
closure of their child's confidences. 14 This feeling seemed to be a
substantial factor in the constitutional balance. The "instinctive
revulsion" and the perceived threat to the family as an institution
within the constitutional framework convinced the court that the
"right to privacy" barred disclosure. The Doe court concluded
that the United States Constitution protects this critical confiden-
tial relationship 5 despite the fact that no previously established
evidentiary privilege applied.
THE BACKDROP OF EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES
A well-established proposition of the law of evidence entitles a
court of justice to "every man's evidence."' 6 Thus, the law places
an affirmative duty on every citizen to give testimony when re-
quired. As Professor Wigmore pointed out, "the demand comes,
not from any person or set of persons, but from the community as
10. Id. at 432-33, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
11. Id. See also G. THOMAS, PARENT EFFECTVENEss TRAINING (1975); Josselyn,
Adolescence, in 1 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 382 (S. Arieti ed. 1974);
Lidz, The Family: The Developmental Setting, in AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHI-
ATRY 252 (S. Arieti ed. 1974).
12. See authorities cited note 11 supra. See also authorities cited notes 14-16
infra.
13. 61 App. Div. 2d at 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
14. Id. at 434, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381. See Coburn, Child-Parent Communications:
Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 DicK. I, REV. 599, 617-18 (1969-70); Man-
ley, Patien Penitent, Clien and Spouse in New York, 21 N.Y. ST. B. A. BuL. 288,
290 (1949).
15. 61 App. Div. 2d at 434, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
16. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
a whole-from justice as an institution and from law and order as
indispensable elements of civilized life." 7 Because the demand
to testify is for the good of the entire society, no man can refuse
the societal mandate in order to protect his own interest unless a
recognized privilege not to testify applies.18 Privileges are spar-
ingly created and narrowly construed. The belief is that without
full investigation and disclosure of all potential evidence, truth
cannot be ascertained and justice served.19
The creation of any privilege should not be an arbitrary and ir-
rational obstacle to the search for truth. Rather, a privilege
should arise only when society makes the reasoned determination
that the protection of some individual interest is of transcendent
importance. 0 Only then can the interest in fact-finding be super-
seded. Certainly, the expedient elicitation of testimony is only
one of the paramount values in a civilized society.2 1 Society, by
permitting certain testimonial privileges, admittedly hampers the
quest for truth in particular instances, thus acknowledging that
there are other values which must be placed in the balance.
"Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely-may be
pursued too keenly-may cost too much."22
17. Id. at 72-73.
18. Bentham, one of the leading opponents of testimonial privileges, illus-
trated this proposition by stating:
[Elverybody is obliged to attend, and nobody complains of it. Were the
Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Lord High Chan-
cellor, to be passing by in the same coach, while a chimney-sweeper and a
barrow-woman were in dispute about a halfpennyworth of apples, and the
chimney-sweeper or the barrow-woman were to think proper to call upon
them for their evidence, could they refuse it? No, most certainly.
J. BENTHAM, Draught for the Organization of Judicial Establishments, in 4 ThE
WORKS OF JEREMY BEN.THrAm 320 (J. Bowring ed. 1843), cited in Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688-89 n.26 (1972). See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 71
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). But compare this statement with Bentham's recogni-
tion that an invasion of the right to privacy requires necessary utility. Negley,
Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy, 31 L. & CoTEMP. PROB. 319, 321-22
(1966). See also Judge Learned Hand in McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
19. 8 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 73 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
20. Robinson, Testimonial Privilege and the School Guidance Counselor, 25
SYRACUSE L. REV. 911, 913 (1974). See also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961).
21. Robinson, Testimonial Privilege and the School Guidance Counselor, 25
SYRACUSE L. REV. 911, 914 & n.16 (1974). Consider also the so-called privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47
(1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege:
Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARv. L. REV. 464, 485
(1977).
22. Pearse v. Pearse, 1 De G. & Sm. 12, 28-29, 63 Eng. Rep. 950, 957 (1846);
Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74
DICK. L. REV. 599, 605 (1969-70); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Coqfu-
sion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 101 (1956). See also
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Most jurisdictions, by statute or common law decision, sanction
limited testimonial privileges protecting certain relationships con-
sidered to be critical.2 3 Recognition of the desirability of protect-
ing these special relationships has been traced, in part, to Roman
law. The Romans felt that it was naturally repugnant to disrupt
the fidelity inherent in intimate relationships.24 The creation of a
testimonial privilege may also arise because of the disutility of
compelling testimony.2 5 No doubt one of the strongest and yet
most difficult rationales to substantiate is based upon the belief
that the parties might be deterred from engaging in an interac-
tion26 which society wants to foster. In most instances, some
combination of both theories interplays to justify a common law
or a statutory privilege.27
The common law right to privacy28 encompasses these preced-
ing justifications while affording broader protection. Jeremy Ben-
tham acknowledged the existence of a right to privacy that
protects the individual from unnecessary intrusions by the
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 n.12 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
overruled on other grounds in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); id. at 470
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
23. See generally 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 201 (1978);
C. McCoMUcH, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 77 (2d ed. 1972): 8 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE ch. 81 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Note, The Psychotherapists'
Privilege, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 297, 298 (1973).
24. Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged Com-
munications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 623-25 (1964); Radin, The Privilege of Confiden-
tial Communications Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. I. REV. 487 (1928). See
also authorities cited note 14 supra.
25. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
26. According to one commentator.
At present, there is one, and only one, justification-that the relationship
is rendered ineffective either because a person is deterred from entering
into it or because the person is frightened into non-disclosure during its
course, and, that the effect of such an absence of the privilege is undesir-
able in light of the relationship to society.
Fisher, supra note 24, at 611.
27. Id. at 624. However, some theorists reject the utilitarian approach entirely.
They prefer to adopt a "theory of rights" approach to privileged communications.
'"These non-utilitarians argue... that persons have moral rights by virtue of their
humanity, and that these rights cannot be over-ridden simply to satisfy a general
utilitarian calculus." Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing,
and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 480 n.66 (1977). See also
note 125 infra.
28. Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. I. REV. 193 (1890).
state.29 A similar recognition of this right may have led the
United States Congress, in January 1975, to adopt broad common-
law confidential privileges.30 Congress enacted these privileges in
place of proposed court rules 31 that would have greatly reduced
the existing testimonial privileges. Congress, by creating broad
testimonial privileges protecting confidential communications,
was deferring to the societal mandate that a zone of privacy 32 be
maintained.
Confidential communications between husband and wife fall
within a protected zone sanctioned in most jurisdictions by a stat-
utory privilege.33 Various other relationships giving rise to confi-
dential privileges include attorney-client, 34 priest-penitent, 35
29. Negley, Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy, 31 L. & CONTEMP.
PRoB. 319, 321-22 (1966).
30. FED. R. EVID. 501. See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 23, at 389-
882; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 5 501 [01], at 501-1 to 501-17
(1979).
31. 28 U.S.C.S. app. 6, at 429 (1975) (proposed rules promulgated by Supreme
Court's advisory committee but rejected by Congress). Mr. Justice Douglas dis-
sented from the promulgation of the rules, stating in part that "this Court does not
write the rules, nor supervise their writing, nor appraise them on their merits,
weighing the pros and cons. The Court concededly is a mere conduit." Id. at 430
(Douglas, J., dissenting). See 2 D. LOuiSELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 23, at 401-11;
Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61 (1973). Comment, The Privilege
Doctrine and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1173
(1973).
32. One commentator wrote a letter to Congress prior to its rejection of the
proposed rules suggesting that several of the rules might present constitutional
difficulties. Professor Black suggested that at least with respect to certain confi-
dential communications the rules might be violative of the right to privacy recog-
nized by the Supreme Court. Black, The Marital and Physician Privileges-A
Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE L. J. 45, 48-51 (1975). See also 2
D. LOuiSEL. & C. MUELLER, supra note 23, at 418-19; Krattenmaker, Testimonial
Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 62 GEo. L.J. 61, 94-100 (1973).
33. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 23, § 219; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
chs. 79 & 83 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Note, The Marital Testimony and Commu-
nications Privileges: Improvements and Uncertainties in California and Federal
Courts, 9 U.C.D. L. REv. 569 (1976). This Comment makes no attempt to differenti-
ate between the various recognized marital privileges.
34. 2 D. LOuiSELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 23, §§ 207-213; C. McCoRauCK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 87-97 (2d ed. 1972); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE ch. 82 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). See also Note, The Attorney-Client Privi-
lege: Fixed Rules, Balancing and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HLv. L REV. 464
(1977).
35. Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958); 2 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 23, at § 214;, 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ch. 87 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961); Callahan, Historical Inquiry Into the Priest-Penitent Privilege, 36 JURIST
328 (1976). See also Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionality of the Priest-
Penitent Privilege-The Application of the Religion Clauses, 29 U. Prrr. L. REV. 27
(1967).
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physician-patient,36 and psychotherapist-patient.37 Considering
the intimate relationships that are protected by a confidential
communication privilege, it is striking that no jurisdictions have
protected the private conversations of parent and child.38 Surely,
the legislatures and courts could not have concluded that the only
confidences within the family worthy of protection are those be-
tween spouses. Are a child's confidences less worthy of protec-
tion?
There is hardly a more fitting situation to apply Federal Circuit
Judge Edgerton's formula 39 than the child-parent confidential in-
teraction. A "communication made in reasonable confidence"
must be protected by a privilege because failure to do so is
"shocking to the moral sense of the community."40 The law can-
36. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 23, § 215; C. McCoRMICK, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 98-105 (2d ed. 1972); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE ch.
86 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
37. 2 D. LOuiSELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 23, § 216. Slovenko, Psychotherapy
and Confidentiality, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375 (1975); Note, The Psychotherapists'
Privilege, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 297 (1973). See also Robinson, Testimonial Privilege
and the School Guidance Counselor, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 911 (1974) (argument for
extension of therapeutic privilege to school guidance counselor relationship). Ad-
ditionally, two courts have suggested that the psychotherapist-patient privilege
has federal constitutional underpinning. See Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977) (note especially Judge Hufstedler's
dissent); In re Ifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970); Annot.,
44 A.L.R.3d 24 (1972); Note, Psychotherapy and Griswold: Is Confidence a Privilege
or Right?, 3 CONN. L. REV. 599 (1971); 49 TEX. L. REV. 929 (1971).
38. See generally Ames v. Ames, 231 Mich. 347, 204 N.W. 117 (1925) (lower
court's refusal to permit son to testify in divorce proceeding held to be reversible
error); see also In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976), in
which the court was confronted with the question of whether the Constitution es-
tablishes a child-parent confidential privilege. The Terry court denied the privi-
lege absent more persuasive authority from the United States Supreme Court. Id.
at 749, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
39. Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
40. Id. at 281. Accord, 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961). Wigmore's four criteria for the creation of a confidential privilege seem to
be satisfied by the child-parent relationship:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satis-
factory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for
the correct disposal of litigation.
Id. See Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the
Child, 74 DIcK. . REV. 599, 623-32 (1969-70) (applies Wigmore's formulation to the
child-parent situation). See notes 9-12 and accompanying text. supra.
not conclude that the absence of confidentiality will have no effect
on the growth of the child and his development into a functioning
individual within the social processes of a democracy.
PRIVACY AND DEMOCRACY
Underlying the rationale for the creation of confidential testimo-
nial privileges is a fundamental understanding of the respective
positions of the individual and the state. The concept of privacy 41
arises out of this balance. Privacy is considered the sine qua non
to development of human dignity. 2 Without governmental re-
spect for individual privacy, relationships based on love and
friendship cannot flourish.43
The right to withhold information is an important component of
individual privacy.44 Privacy also entails the need to communi-
cate as an essential aspect of the individual's nourishment and
growth.45 A society that does not afford this protected zone to the
individual does not foster his growth.46 This lack of growth, in
turn, hinders the development of the family into a strong, in-
dependent institution within the societal structure. 47 Thus, the
political system and its values will determine the degree to which
the individual's privacy interest is respected by government.48
Confidential relationships will not inspire the protection of testi-
monial privileges when the political scheme does not place strong
emphasis on privacy and resulting individual autonomy.
41. Privacy is a multifaceted concept, and no attempt is made to explore all its
possible permutations. See generally Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Ger-
ety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977); Shils, Privacy: Its
Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 281 (1966).
42. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1000 (1964). See generally Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE
L.J. 475 (1968).
43. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE LJ. 475, 484 (1968). See generally G. SIIMEL, THE
SocIoLoGY OF GEORG SMnMEL 307-44 (1950); Brim & Ruebhausen, Privacy and Be-
havioral Research, 65 COLum. L. REV. 1184, 1188-90 (1965).
44. Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 L & CONTEMP. PROB.
307, 307 (1966) (the desire to remain an enigma). See generally E. GOFFMAN, THE
PRESENTATION OF SELF I EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). Goffman's discussion focuses on
the function of selective disclosure. An individual by limiting disclosure of vital
information about himself can control another's perception.
45. A. WEsTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31-36 (1967); Brim & Ruebhausen, Pri-
vacy and Behavioral Research, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1184, 1189 (1965).
46. The autonomy that privacy protects is also vital to the develop-
ment of individuality and consciousness of individual choice in life. Leon-
tine Young has noted that "without privacy there is no individuality.
There are only types. Who can know what he thinks and feels if he never
has the opportunity to be alone with his thoughts and feelings?"
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 34 (1967) (quoting I YOUNG, LIFE AiLMoNG THE
GIANTs (1966)).
47. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 484 (1968). See generally authorities cited
note 43 supra.
48. See generally A. WESTm, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM ch. 2 (1967).
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A totalitarian state is characterized by a high level of surveil-
lance and disclosure.49 Neither the individual nor his associations
are free from the state's intense scrutiny. By contrast, the mod-
ern constitutional democracy draws its lifeblood from the in-
dependent and self-reliant individuals which it nurtures. 50 This is
achieved through the media of privacy and the family.
Liberal democratic theory assumes that a good life for the individual must
have substantial areas of interest apart from political participation-time
devoted to sports, arts, literature, and similar non-political pursuits....
[It] maintains a strong commitment to the family as a basic and autono-
mous unit responsible for important educational, religious, and moral
roles, and therefore the family is allowed to assert claims to physical and
legal privacy against both society and the state.5 1
This theoretical underpinning of the right to privacy is indica-
tive of the values at stake when the government arguably en-
croaches upon the individual's confidential relationships. The
search for a confidential child-parent privilege amidst the consti-'
tutionally protected right to privacy must always touch upon the
nature of the democratic process. Whether this particular rela-
tionship warrants constitutional safeguards depends on both the
significance of the child-parent relationship within the political
structure and the burden placed upon that relationship by the
failure to sanction a zone of privacy.
THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ZONE OF PRIVACY
At the outset it must be stressed that neither the United States
Constitution nor the Bill of Rights makes explicit mention of a
right to privacy. Yet the United States Supreme Court recognized
long ago that the absence of an enumerated right is not necessar-
ily a bar to constitutional protection. 2 A constitutional right may
49. Id. at 23. Accord, H. ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 389-419 (1958);
R. LiFToN, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM (1963). The totali-
tarian regime demands total loyalty and the breakdown of all confidences. Id. at
426; B. MussoLINI, FASCISM, DOCTRINE, AND INSTITUTIONS (1935); Hollander, Pri-
vacy: A Bastion Stormed, in 12 PROBLEMS OF ComMuISM 1 (1963); Mead & Calas,
Child Training Ideas in a Post Revolutionary Context: Soviet Russia, in CmLD-
HOOD IN CONTEmPORARY CuLTuREs 179, 190-91 (1955).
50. See, e.g., H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDIrION 23-69 (1959); THE FEDERALIST
No. 10 (J. Madison); id. No. 15 (A. Hamilton); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 23
(1967); Rossiter, Patterns of Liberty, in ASPECTS OF LIBERTY 15 (1958); Brandeis &
Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). See generally A. DE Toc-
QUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (rev. ed 1966); D. FELLMAN, THE CONSTrru-
TIONAL RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION ch. 1 (1963).
51. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 24 (1967).
52. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886); See also Kauper, Penum-
be present by implication.53 In Boyd v. United States, the Court
asserted that a constitutional provision protecting individual
rights must be liberally construed.54
One such liberal articulation of a general right to individual pri-
vacy can be found in Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in
Olmstead v. United States.55 Mr. Justice Brandeis posited that
the framers of the constitution "sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone ... .-"56 Appreciation of this value of privacy, as a compo-
nent of civilized life, led the Supreme Court to shield the family
7
and its autonomy.
bras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The
Griswold Case, 64 MCH. L. REv. 235 (1965); McKay, The Right to Privacy: Emana.
tions and Intimations, 64 MICH. L. REv. 259 (1965).
53. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
54. Id. Applying the fourth and fifth amendments to the situation at hand, the
Boyd Court stated.
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive
form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing
in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal
modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule
that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property
should be liberally construed.
Id. at 635. See also In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 250 (1887).
55. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
56. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
57. The issue of what constitutes the "family" is not altogether clear in the
Supreme Court decisions. See the Court's recent discussion in Smith v. Organiza-
tion of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). The Court held that, within the New
York program of foster care, a foster parent did not have the same claim to consti-
tutional safeguards as the natural parents. However, the majority acknowledged
that
the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and
to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the
intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in "promot [ing] a
way of life" through the instruction of children, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972), as well as from the fact of blood relationship. No
one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent rela-
tionship between an adult and a child in his or her care may exist even in
the absence of blood relationship.
Id. at 844 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). See Moore v. City of E. Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); The
Supreme Cour4 1976 Term, 91 Hanv. L. REV. 72, 128-37 (1977); Comment, The Legal
Family--A Definitional Analysis, 13 J. FAM. L. 781 (1973-74).
Additionally, in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. at 845, Mr.
Justice Brennan suggested that were he required to choose between protecting
the child's natural parents or the foster parent, he would shield the former be-
cause the ties are "intrinsic human rights." Id. See Note, The Fundamental Right
to Family Integrity and Its Role in New York Foster Care Adjudication, 44 BROOK-
LYN L. REv. 63 (1977). The question then arises if a foster family would be entitled
to the same substantive rights as the natural parents. The majority indicates that
this does not necessarily follow. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S.
at 843 n.48. Yet the "parent" in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), was
an aunt and not a natural parent. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
[voL. 16: 811, 1979] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
As early as 1923, the Court, in Meyer v. Nebraska, held unconsti-
tutional a statute that prohibited families from formally educating
their children in modern foreign languages. 58 This statute was to
apply until the student reached the ninth grade. Construing the
language of the fourteenth amendment,59 the Court concluded
that its safeguard extends not only to bodily restraint but also en-
sures the right "to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children."60 This expansive interpretation of
the fourteenth amendment was derived from the Court's under-
standing that the family unit is functionally at the heart of democ-
racy.6 1 Further, the decision is premised on the belief that the
family must be permitted autonomy.62 Absent this autonomy, the
family cannot foster the child's development adequately to
achieve the traditional goals of our highly individualized demo-
cratic society.
A subsequent articulation of this doctrine of family educational
431 U.S. at 843 n.49; Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 504-06 (plurality opin-
ion).
58. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
59. "[N]o state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty or property, with-
out due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
60. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added).
The right to marry and raise a family is considered to be one of the basic civil
rights of all people. It is basic both for the pursuit of happiness and for the sur-
vival of the human race. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The state
cannot unreasonably and arbitrarily interfere with this right. Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
"While the outer limits of [the right to personal privacy] have not been marked
by the Court, it is clear that.., an individual may make without unjustified gov-
emnment interference... decisions relating to marriage,. . family relationships,
and... child rearing .... ." Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85
(1977), cited with approval in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). But see id.
at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Mr. Justice Rehnquist indicated that marriage may not be the kind of "funda-
mental right" that invariably triggers the strictest scrutiny. The level of scrutiny
depends on whether the burden on marriage is "direct." Yet the burden in
Redhail was an outright prohibition of marriage-what could be more direct? Jus-
tice Rehnquist seemed to have based his decision on Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47
(1977), which also involved economic motivations. The cases are distinguishable;
because in Jobst marriage was only discouraged, there was no outright prohibi-
tion. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 408 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. Contrast this interpretation with the attitude toward the family embraced
by totalitarian society or Plato's "Ideal Republic." See PLATo, THE REPUBLIC (P.
Shorey trans. 1970); notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra. The Meyer Court
recognized the basic distinction in political philosophy. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. at 401-02.
62. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
autonomy serves to illuminate further the spectrum of this zone
of privacy.63 The Court, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, concluded
that a state cannot compel children between the ages of eight and
sixteen to attend public school.64 Parents have a constitutional
right to send their children to parochial school. The Pierce Court
reasoned that
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.
The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recog-
nize and prepare him for additional obligations.
65
Meyer and Pierce form the foundation for any discussion that
explores the limits of familial privacy and autonomy. It is not ar-
gued that the state may never regulate aspects of family life, for
surely it can.66 Rather, as recent cases have emphasized, the
state must demonstrate a compelling67 need to substantially bur-
den a fundamental constitutional value.68 Nor does this protected
63. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
64. Id. at 534-35.
65. Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
66. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (a legitimate exercise of
state's police power might outweigh the familial interest).
67. The requirement of a compelling state interest is one component of the
strict scrutiny model of equal protection. "[T]he idea of strict scrutiny
acknowledges that other political choices-those burdening fundamental rights
* . . must be subjected to close analysis in order to preserve substantive values
... [and] liberty." See L. TmE, AmiucAN CONsITr ONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1000
(1978). The Supreme Court has applied similar language in numerous cases. See,
e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), where the court expressed this underly-
ing rationale:
[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. In-
deed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due
Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile
values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for effi-
ciency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government offi-
cials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
Id. at 656 (emphasis added). See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971)
(due process requires a "countervailing" state interest of "overriding" signifi-
cance).
68. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Yoder Court held that the
state did not show an interest in compulsory high school education of "sufficient
magnitude" to overshadow the Amish family's interest under the "free exercise"
clause of the first amendment. Id. at 214. The majority closely scrutinized the
compulsory education scheme and found it unconstitutional in its application to
the peculiarities of the Amish child's education. Id. at 221-29. But cf. Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 407 (1978) (Mr. Justice Rehnquist indicated in his dissent
that burdening of the family need not always activate the most demanding scru-
tiny).
Assuming that a fundamental family interest is recognized, the government
must then establish a compelling interest to warrant intrusion on the asserted
right. Thus, if a child-parent confidential communication is acknowledged as a
"fundamental right," then it follows that a substantial government interest must
be shown in order to intrude upon it. Surely, speed and efficiency in the ascertain-
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zone of family rights stop with the parents' freedom to make edu-
cational decisions. M/fr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Poe v. UII-
man,69 submitted that the intimate relations of the marital
bedroom are shielded from all substantial and arbitrary intru-
sions or restraints by government.7 0 The majority in Griswold v.
Connecticut later adopted similar reasoning.71 The Griswold
Court's opinion, written by Mr. Justice Douglas, concluded that
the Connecticut statutory scheme which prohibited contracep-
tives was unconstitutional because of the substantial burden it
placed upon a protected zone of privacy.72 Summing up, Justice
Douglas stressed:
The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees....
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bed-
rooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is re-
pulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a pur-
pose as any involved in our prior decisions.1 3
More recent cases74 have extended the holding of Griswold be-
yond the marital community decisions regarding birth control to
other aspects of intimate family relations. State statutes regulat-
ment of truth cannot dictate such an intrusion. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656
(1972). For additional situations involving "fundamental rights," see Carey v. Pop-
ulation Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See generally The Supreme Cour4 1976 Term, 91
HAnv. L. REV. 72, 137-52 (1977).
69. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). The majority never reached the merits in Poe. Id. at
497.
70. Id. at 553-54 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
71. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (criminal sanctions against the
use of contraceptives by marriage partners is denial of due process). See Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-53 (1972) (Griswold "privacy" rationale extended to
single adults. The Baird Court strictly scrutinized asserted state interests and
found them inadequate). See generally Note, Group Privacy, The Right to Huddle,
8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 219, 228 (1977).
72. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485. The state failed to demonstrate a
"subordinating interest which is compelling." Id. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).
73. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
74. See generally L. TRiNE, AMERICAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW ch. 15, at 886
(1978).
ing or prohibiting abortion 75 and regulating family living arrange-
ments 7 6 have confronted the Court. These cases have
necessitated the Supreme Court's further examination of the doc-
trines surrounding family privacy and autonomy.
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the City sought to regulate
the type of family members permitted to occupy a "single family
dwelling."77  Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Powell re-
marked: "[W] hen the government intrudes on choices concerning
family living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the
importance of the governmental interests advanced and the ex-
tent to which they are served by the challenged regulation."7 8
Earlier decisions of the Court acknowledging the sanctity of the
family unit as the bulwark of democracy comprised the founda-
tion of Justice Powell's reasoning.
7 9
The language of Moore, when considered in conjunction with
the discussion of privacy found in Whalen v. Roe,8 0 goes far to
elucidate the Court's present view of familial privacy. Professor
Tribe, in his treatise American Constitutional Law, summed up
the significance of the Whalen decision: The rights described in
Whalen comprise more than the "least common denominator" of
the Supreme Court's prior holdings with "respect to marital
75. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (state must demon-
strate compelling interest and necessity to burden a woman's "fundamental right"
to an abortion). See note 68 supra.
76. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
77. Id. at 494-97. The state's statute recognized few categories of related indi-
viduals as "family" for the purpose of living together. See also note 57 supra (dis-
cussion of the family).
78. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 499.
79. The "Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the
institution... is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is through
the family that we inculcate ... many of our most cherished values. . . ." Id. at
503-04 (emphasis added). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 495-96 (Goldberg, J., concurring),
and id. at 502-03 (White, J., concurring), with Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. at 549 (White, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice White believes that the due process
clause extends "substantial protection to various phases of family life." Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 549. The right to live in a home with more than
one grandchild is not within the scope of this protection. See Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 407 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See note 60 supra.
Further, confidentiality is more fundamental to the family relationship than is
the choice of which members of the extended family with whom to live. Family
confidentiality is bound up in the maintenance of various aspects of the family it-
self. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognition of spousal confiden-
tiality). See also Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 954 (1977); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829
(1970) (recognition of psychotherapist-patient confidentiality).
80. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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choice, procreation, contraception, and child rearing. 81 In
Whalen, Mr. Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, indi-
cated that the Supreme Court's doctrine of the right to privacy
encompasses two distinct rights.8 2 The first right secures the
somewhat general "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters."8 3 The second right protects the interest of the
individual or of the family "in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions. 84
Whalen is critical to a discussion of confidential privileges. The
issue addressed by the Court in Whalen focused on the extent to
which a patient85 has a right to withhold information that he does
not wish to share with others.86 The Court upheld the New York
drug control scheme87 requiring limited disclosure of specified
regulated drugs. In so holding, the Court closely examined the
asserted legislative purpose 88 and the elaborate safeguards8 9 to
the individual's privacy which were built into the statute. Given
the circumscribed disclosure and the numerous safeguards, the
Court did not require the state to prove that patient information
is absolutely necessary.90 Normally, when a fundamental interest
is at stake the state must make a greater showing of necessity.91
The scope of disclosure required in Whalen should be con-
trasted with the ubiquitous disclosure of a public trial proceeding.
The threat to privacy is greatly magnified when the facts are
81. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-1, at 886 (1978).
82. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). Contra, Crain v. Krehbiel, 443
F. Supp. 202, 207 (N.D. Cal. 1977). District Judge Renfrew has suggested a third
aspect of privacy. See generally Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanc-
tuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447 (1976).
83. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 599. See id. n.25.
84. Id. at 600. However, Mr. Justice Stewart does not recognize a "general"
right to privacy. Id. at 607-09 (concurring opinion).
85. In comparison, the issue addressed in this Comment concerns the parents'
or child's right to withhold information from the general public.
86. L TRmE, AMERICAN CONsTrrTIONAL LAW § 15-1, at 888 (1978).
87. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 591 nn.6-13.
88. Id. at 592-93.
89. The information was to be kept in a secured data bank. Seventeen Depart-
ment of Health employees and 24 investigators had access to the information. Ad-
ditionally, the statute provided for a fine of up to $2,000 and one year's
imprisonment. Id. at 593-95.
90. Id. at 598. Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring, indicated that had the statute
permitted broad dissemination of the information, only a compelling interest could
overcome the patient's right to privacy. Id. at 606. But see id. at 607-09 (Stewart,
J., concurring).
91. See notes 67-68 and accompanying text supra.
bared to the entire world. Additionally, if the person disclosing
the information is a member of the parent-child community, the
constitutionally protected realm of family life is also involved.
This added factor would weigh heavily in the balance against the
state interest.9 2 When government attempts to compel disclosure
of confidential information in open court in a manner threaten-
ing 9 3 to the psychological effectiveness of the child-parent rela-
tionship, the strictest judicial scrutiny should apply. The state
must sustain a much greater showing of necessity than the
Whalen Court required.
Until the New York court's decision in People v. Doe,94 the no-
tion of a constitutionally sanctioned familial zone of privacy had
not been extended to the situation of parent-child confidential
communications. 95 The creation of such a privilege would follow
from an acknowledgment by the United States Supreme Court
that confidential communications play a critical role in the family.
The already recognized and secured values of family privacy and
autonomy demand such a privilege. An examination of social-
psychological theory 96 will reveal that confidentiality is essential
92. Consider Mr. Chief Justice Burger's statement:
The Court's refusal to afford constitutional protection to such commercial
matters as bank records, California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21
(1974), or drug prescription records, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977),
only serves to emphasize the importance of truly private papers or com-
munications, such as a personal diary or family correspondence. These
private papers lie at the core of First and Fourth Amendment interests.
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 529 n.27 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
93. See notes 106-16 and accompanying text infra.
94. 61 App. Div. 2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978).
95. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
96. The influence of scientific and social science literature in the legal deci-
sionmaking process is now widely appreciated. Justice Brandeis held the firm
conviction that courts must rely on facts and data. "Knowledge is essential to un-
derstanding; and understanding should precede judging. Sometimes, if we would
guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold." Burns Baking Co. v.
Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 520 (1924) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., dissenting). See Adams v.
Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 600 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 21 (1970).
In recent years the majority of the Court has looked to other scholarly profes-
sions for guidance before making major policy decisions. See, e.g., Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (Court examined educational and social data in as-
sessing the consequence to the Amish child of compulsory high school education);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (Court used social scientist's findings in con-
sidering choice between six and 12-member juries); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (studies indicated that certain
types of drug abuse should be considered a disease); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (Chief Justice Warren indicated that the Court's decision
was supported by substantial psychological data). Contra, Doyle, Can Social Sci-
ence Data Be Used in Judicial Decision Making?, 6 J.L & EDUC. 13 (1977). The au-
thor expressed doubts as to the real significance of social science in constitutional
adjudication. 'The decisive factor is the constitution,.., the wording of the con-
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to the family relationship.
CONFDENTIALITY AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS
Confidentiality is an essential aspect of certain socially benefi-
cial relationships. In the absence of confidentiality, interaction
might be avoided;97 but even if parties interact, the fear of disclo-
sure might render the relationship ineffective to achieve its in-
tended purposes. For example, in the psychotherapist-patient
relationship98 the goal is the psychological adjustment of the pa-
tient. Therapy is brought about, not solely by any specific treat-
ment, but principally by the quality of the patient-therapist
interchange itself.9 9 When participating in this exchange, the pa-
tient reveals the most intimate aspects of his experiences' 00 to
the psychotherapist "so that they can explore the meaning and
experiential realities of his life."101 Privacy is imperative here. 02
stitution,.., history, precedent,. . . reason and moral law or natural law." Id. at
15.
97. For a discussion of the role of deterrence as an impetus to the creation of
evidentiary privileges, see notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra.
98. Psychotherapy has been characterized as the "alteration of human behav-
ior through interpersonal relationships." Comment, The Interest in the Practice of
Psychotherapy, 8 Am. PsYcH. 48, 49 (1953), quoted with approval in Fisher, supra
note 24, at 618. Accord, Note, The Psychotherapists' Privilege, 12 WASHBuRN L.J.
297, 301 (1973).
99. Fiedler, Quantitative Studies of the Role of Therapists' Feelings Towards
Their Patients, in PSYCHOTHERAPY-THEoRY AND RESEARCH 296-97 (1953). See gen-
erally C. ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY (1951); R. SLOVENKo, PsYcHIATRY
AN LAW 61 (1973).
100. "The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the
world. He exposes to the therapist not only what his words directly express; he
lays bare his entire self .... " M. GuTrrmACHER & H. WEIOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LA-W 272 (1952), cited with approval in Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064,
1072 (9th Cir. 1976) (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 954 (1977); Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See gen-
erally C. ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY (1951).
101. R. SLOVENKO, PSYCmATRY AND LAW 61 (1973).
102. M. GUTrmACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952); C.
ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY 343-45, 496 (1951); Fisher, supra note 24, at
619-20; Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World. Part 11, 41 MINN. L. REV.
731, 744-45 (1957); Note, The Psychotherapists'Privilege, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 297, 301-
02 (1973); 4 U. KAN. L. REV. 597 (1956).
But consider one commentator's observation that "[tlrust-not absolute confi-
dentiality-is the cornerstone of psychotherapy. Talking about a patient... with-
out his knowledge or consent would be a breach of trust." Slovenko,
Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, 24 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 375, 395 (1975).
Courts as well have acknowledged the therapist's need for confidentiality by rec-
ognizing a qualified constitutional right. This right arises out of the right of the
patient to privacy. See Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
Without privacy, there is a risk that the patient will be inhibited
in his revelations and thus not gain the benefits of the relation-
ship.103
Similarly, the effectiveness of at least one aspect of the parent-
child relationship is coextensive with the degree to which commu-
nication is fostered by confidentiality. The parent-child relation-
ship is not a professional, therapeutic relationship. Nor does the
promise of confidentiality act as an impetus to the creation of the
relationship. 0 4 However, the fact that the relationship does not
arise in anticipation of confidentiality does not in itself preclude
the importance of confidentiality. Once the family comes into be-
ing, confidentiality becomes crucial.
The growth and effectiveness of any human being is dependent
on the quality of his interpersonal relationships1 05 Interpersonal
communications constitute a fundamental aspect of most human
interaction.106 According to one eminent family therapist, "com-
munication is to relationships what breathing is to maintaining
life." 0 7
Some communication, and its concomitant interpersonal rela-
tionship, will flourish only within the medium of privacy.108 This
is true even though the overall relationship between the parties
may be sustained because of other needs. The parent-child rela-
tionship itself exists at least in part because of the child's depen-
dency.109 Yet, the additional factors that come into play to make
nied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977); In re ifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr.
829 (1970). See also note 37 supra.
103. Fisher, supra note 24, at 618.
104. Compare the parent-child situation to the marital situation, in which confi-
dentiality is not really an inducement. See Fawal, Questioning the Marital Privi.
lege: A Medieval Philosophy in a Modern World, 7 Cutt. L. REV. 307 (1976), in
which the author argues that the confidential communications of the marital rela-
tionship should be protected only if disclosure would result in damage to that rela-
tionship.
105. B. FISHER, PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN COnmmURcATION ch. 6, at 286-300 (1978);
H. SULLIVAN, THE INTERPERSONAL THEORY OF PSYCHIATRY chs. 7, 10, 12 (1953). See
generally J. CHADwICK-JONEs, SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY: ITS STRUCTURE AND IN-
FLUENCE IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1976); K. DANZIGER, INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICA-
TIONS (1976); E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY, YOUTH AND CRISIS chs. 2, 3 (1968).
106. Ruesch, The Role of Communication in Therapeutic Transactions, in THE
HumAx DIALOGUE 260 (1967). See generally D. STEWART, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
COmmUNICATION (1968). For a discussion of the dynamics of human communica-
tion, see V. SATIn, CONJOINT F~mWmY THERAPY chs. 9, 10 (1964); Ruesch, Synopsis of
the Theory of Human Communications, in THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FAWILY PSY-
CHIATRY 227 (J. Howell ed. 1971).
107. V. SATnR, MAKING CONTACT 18 (1976).
108. See notes 33-37 & 102 supra.
109. Dependency has been defined as the extent to which an individual relies
on another or others for social reality. Schachter, Deviation, Rejection and Com-
munication, in APPROACHES, CONTEXTS, AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
311, 322 (E. Sampson ed. 1964). See generally G. CLORE, K. RENNER, R. ROSE, & J.
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up the total parent-child interaction must not be taken to detract
from the functional aspect of the interpersonal relationship de-
pendent on communication. Just as in similar relationships
rooted in communication,11O the guidance-oriented dimension of
the parental role demands the backdrop of confidentiality."' The
Doe court, reaching a similar conclusion, stated:
It would be difficult to think of a situation which more strikingly embodies
the intimate and confidential relationship Which exists among family
members than that in which a troubled young person, perhaps beset with
remorse and guilt, turns for counsel and guidance to his mother and fa-
ther. There is nothing more natural, more consistent with our concept of
the parental role, than that a child may rely on his parents for help and
advice.
11 2
Absent confidentiality, the familial setting is not ripe for par-
ents to act as their children's confessors and guides. Some find-
ings have suggested that children who are free to confide" 3 in
their parents show a greater social adjustment," 4 exemplified by
better social compliance, greater conformity" 5 with social norms,
and emotional stability.nl6
The functional effect of the parent-child interaction is conso-
nant with the United States Supreme Court's recognition of the
WIGGINS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERsoNALrrY 149 (1971) (discussion of the various
kinds of human dependency); Maccoby & Masters, Attachment and Dependency,
in 2 MANUAL OF CHUD PSYCHOLOGY 73 (P. Mussen ed. 1970).
110. See note 102 supra. See also Robinson, Testimonial Privilege and the
School Guidance Counselor, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 911 (1974) (discussion of the
analogous need to protect the confidentiality of the school guidance counselor).
111. Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the
Child, 74 DICK. L. REV. 599, 618-21 (1970).
112. People v. Doe, 61 App. Div. 2d 429, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1978).
113. "Free to confide" refers not only to an environment conducive to confi-
dence but also to an inclination on the part of the child to confide. It is assumed
that if an atmosphere is hostile to confidentiality the child will never develop the
disposition to confide. Knowledge of the absence of confidentiality would surely
stifle confession. See C. ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY 343-45 (1951). See
generally authorities cited note 102 supra. But the child need not be aware, at the
time the statements are made, that the law does not protect his confidentiality.
The spectacle of attempting to force disclosure is destructive in its own right. Peo-
ple v. Doe, 61 App. Div. at 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380; Coburn, Child-Parent Communi-
cations: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 DicK. L. REV. 599, 628-29 (1970).
114. A JERSILD, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE 248 (2d ed. 1967). See gener-
ally WHTE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHII HEALTH AND PROTECTION, THE DELIN-
QUENT CHILD 79 (1932).
115. See generally Johoda, Conformity and Independence, in APPROACHES, CON-
TEXTS, AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 96 (E. Sampson ed. 1964).
116. People v. Doe, 61 App. Div. 2d at 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380; A. JERSILD, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE 248 (2d ed. 1967); see authorities cited note 11 and
accompanying text supra.
role of the family in American life.117 Thus,
[i]f we accept the proposition that the fostering of a confidential parent-
child relationship is necessary to the child's development of a positive sys-
tem of values, and results in an ultimate good to society as a whole, there
can be no doubt what the effect on that relationship would be if the State
could compel parents to disclose information given to them in the context
of that confidential setting.
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If the family is to succeed in its constitutionally acknowledged
posture, its right to privacy must be respected. The Doe court ap-
propriately extended constitutional protection to the confidential
dimension of family life. Preservation of the family necessitates
this sanction of confidentiality.
PARAMETERS OF THE CHI1D-PAENT ZONE OF PRIVACY
An attempt to posit the entire scope of the proposed child-par-
ent confidential privilege would be futile. However, there are
some general principles that a court should consider. "Due proc-
ess" itself cannot be reduced to a formula." 9 It reflects the bal-
ance that "our nation, built upon postulates of respect for the
liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the
demands of organized society.' 20 When a "fundamental" interest
is implicated, a court should carefully scrutinize the asserted
state interest.121 This process operates within the context of each
set of facts. The dimensions of the individual's zone of privacy
evolve with the case law. This case-by-case adjudication "accords
with the tried and traditional" approach to defining the scope of a
constitutional right.122
In the instance of the child-parent communication, the state's
interest in obtaining testimony cannot be doubted.123 Usually,
however, the interest of the individual and of society in protecting
"the parent-child relationship is of such overwhelming signifi-
cance that the state's interest in fact-finding must give way."1
24
The destructiveness of requiring disclosures overshadows the loss
of potential evidence in most instances. Yet the privilege is not
117. See notes 58-78 and accompanying text supra.
118. People v. Doe, 61 App. Div. 2d at 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
119. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. See notes 67-68 and accompanying text supra.
122. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
123. People v. Doe, 61 App. Div. 2d at 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
124. Compare id., with Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977), and In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 829 (1970). These latter cases involved a psychotherapist asserting his pa-
tient's rights when the patient had tendered the issues into evidence. These
courts' results might have been otherwise had the case involved a patient defend-
ant asserting the confidential privilege.
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absolute.125
The child-parent privilege might be restricted in the following
situations: When the child is the chief prosecution witness, the
defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation might pre-
clude the application of the privilege.126 The accused must be
permitted to impeach a confronting witness by the introduction of
prior inconsistent statement to call into question the credibility of
the witness' testimony.127 Similarly, to permit the assertion of a
confidential privilege relevant to an issue which the child himself
tendered into evidence would be manifestly unfair. 28 Nor should
the privilege apply to protect communications made to enable the
child to commit a future crime or fraud.129 This exception would
not remove the privilege as to the confession of previous
125. Some authorities argue for absolute constitutional rights not susceptible to
dilution by the courts. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (balancing tends to erode first amendment rights); Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 60-80 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Sterk, Testimonial Privileges:
An Analysis of Horizontal Choice of Law Problems, 61 MiN. L. REV. 461, 468
(1977); Note, Formalism, Legal Realim, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy
Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. TL REV. 945, 982-85 (1977) (bal-
ancing erodes these rights); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Bal-
ancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARv. L REv. 464, 479 (1977).
Consider Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), in which the majority, accord-
ing to Justice Stewart, adopted a "crabbed view" of the first amendment: The ma-
jority refused to adopt even a qualified newsman's privilege based on the first
amendment. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For a more moderate approach to
the majority's holding, see id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring) (Powell adopts a
case-by-case approach and would limit the decision to its facts). See also Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (Powell, Brennan, & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting); Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege
for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975).
126. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), in which the chief prosecution wit-
ness in a larceny case asserted a juvenile privilege of anonymity. The Court held
that the defendant's sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses against him
overshadowed the local privilege. State v. Hembd, 305 Minn. 120, 232 N.W.2d 872
(1975) (the medical privilege must yield to right to confrontation).
However, the right to confront and to cross-examine a witness is not absolute
and must sometimes "bow to accommodate other legitimate interests." Chambers
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973). See generally 60 MMN. L. REV. 1086 (1976).
127. See note 126 supra.
128. Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954
(1977); In re Lifschutz, 3 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 829 (1970); FED.
R. EVID. 501; CAl. EvI. CODE § 1016 (West 1966 & Supp. 1978); 2 D. LOUisELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 23, § 216, at 611.
129. See generally FED. R. EvW. 501; Ca. EvD. CODE §§ 956, 981, 997, 1018 (West
1966 & Supp. 1978); C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 78, 95,
at 162, 199-201 (2d ed. 1972); 2 D. LOuiSELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 23, §§ 213, 219,
at 578-80, 649.
crimes.130
The parent-child privilege will find its widest application in pro-
ceedings when the child is the defendant or the accused. When
the child is on the defensive, it is consistent with the underlying
premises of sanctioning the privilege to permit its assertion. The
child's parents should stand by his side and should not be forced
to betray him in court.
CONCLUSION
Ample evidence supports the premise that confidentiality be-
tween parent and child is an essential component of their rela-
tionship. The child's healthy development stands in the balance.
Seizing upon this, the Doe court unanimously prescribed a consti-
tutional right to protect confidential parent-child communications.
This constitutional right both arises out of and buttresses the
firmly established rights to family privacy and autonomy already
enumerated by the United States Supreme Court. The logical
consequences of the Court's prior holdings would erect a sanctu-
ary to the private communications of this intimate relationship.
Only after these natural ties of fidelity are respected will the di-
rective of the Bill of Rights be discharged.
JEFF M. SANDLOW
130. See generally 2 D. LousELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 23, § 219, at 649 n.67.
